On March 21, Peruvians took to the streets to protest government inaction against a surging crime wave. The recent assassination of Paul Flores, a famous cumbia singer, in the capital underscored the deepening security crisis afflicting Peru and its Andean neighbors. News of extortion rackets and contract killings have become routine headlines, and with the 2026 general election approaching, public safety now tops voters’ concerns. Early political campaign ads are already flocking the streets of Lima with candidates proudly presenting themselves as the “Peruvian Bukele” in reference to the Salvadorian president and his heavy approach to crime.
In response to the crime wave, the government on March 17 declared its third state of emergency in less than a year, suspending basic liberties to allow police to make arrests without judicial orders. Yet, while authorities focus on crackdowns against violent crime, they risk ignoring the deeper cause of the crisis: a decade of institutional decay marked by jailed presidents and pervasive corruption.
In the absence of broad-based political reforms and a sincere effort to address corruption as a root cause, Peru might soon fall into the same trap it did in 2021. Amid the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, voters elected populist Pedro Castillo as president. Castillo fed off the discontent against the state and sought to break Peru’s democratic order with an unsuccessful “self-coup,” for which he was later impeached and imprisoned. As Peru enters a new electoral cycle amid a crime wave, candidates must prioritize meaningful institutional reforms over hollow tough-on-crime rhetoric. Otherwise, the country will remain trapped in a cycle in which corruption breeds crime and democracy hangs by a thread.
As in neighboring Ecuador and Chile, the current crime wave has ground Peru to a halt. Between 2019 and 2024, reported extortions increased sixfold, and in 2025 every third Peruvian reports knowing a victim of extortion, many of whom are small business owners. Homicides, too, have doubled since 2019. And in January of this year alone, there were 203 percent more homicides than in January of 2017.
Behind these alarming figures hide strengthened transnational criminal organizations, such as the Tren de Aragua, as well as a myriad of other drug trafficking organizations, mafia syndicates, and gangs that alternately cooperate, collude, and compete for the control of illegal activities. While drug trafficking, homicides, and extortions are terrorizing Peru’s populous coastal cities, Peru’s Amazon has been ravaged by illegal gold mining, where illegal miners have made record profits as the value of gold has soared in international markets. In 2025, over 75 percent of Peruvians report being scared when leaving their homes.
While transnational criminal organizations are the actors behind the current crime wave, it is weak state capacity that has allowed the crime to permeate. The Peruvian sate’s capacity to respond has been impaired by political corruption, often influenced by criminal actors themselves. By 2024, 67 of 130 Congress members (a simple majority of Peru’s legislature) were under criminal investigation. When prosecutors charged Congress members of allegedly being part of criminal organizations, Congress passed a law narrowing the definition of “organized crime,” hindering investigations into corruption and extortion. President Dina Boluarte did not veto this bill, and it became law in August 2024. (Congress later reinstated extortion under the definition of organized crime but left many corruption offenses excluded.) Congress also passed a law in in September 2024 that placed a larger role of the police in criminal investigations, taking functions away from the Attorney General’s Office, which legal experts warned would weaken investigative efficiency. And Boluarte has weakened the Attorney General’s Office as she herself is being investigated for corruption. As a result, the state’s ability to prosecute crimes has been stymied by public officials seeking to blunt investigations against themselves.
Peruvians will vote next year amid a crisis that the state is incapable of protecting its citizens from. The parallels between the 2021 and 2026 elections are clear. In 2021, voters were enraged by Peru’s world-highest per capita COVID-19 death rate and a scandal in which political elites received vaccines before the public. Peruvians’ frustration propelled Castillo—then a little-known populist with no governing plan—to victory. After leading a government ridden with corruption, Castillo and his advisors sought to break the constitutional order with a “self-coup.” Peruvian democratic institutions held up and their attempt remained short-lived.
Now, heading into 2026, voters face a new crisis: a crime wave and a state failing to ensure public safety. This climate is fertile ground for populist promises of a mano dura, or “iron fist,” approach to combating crime. But any real solution must also tackle crime’s institutional roots. Candidates should promote a comprehensive political reform that reduces organized crime’s influence in the country’s political bodies. This reform should include steps that make running for office more difficult for those charged with corruption. In addition, the Attorney General’s Office should be depoliticized and promote a new cohort of competent, apolitical prosecutors and judges.
At the same time, the United States and other partner nations must recognize the risk that corruption poses to the survival of Peruvian democracy. The US State Department should designate Peruvian public officials engaged in corruption and prevent them from entering the United States, an action it took this month against former Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was convicted of corruption charges in Argentina. Equally critical is addressing other root causes of crime—poverty, inequality, and lack of education—which have made Peru’s youth vulnerable to recruitment by criminal gangs in the first place.
Politicians promising to be the “Peruvian Bukele” may garner attention. But leaving the institutional causes of crime unaddressed will only deepen Peru’s democratic crisis while doing little to curb crime.
Martin Cassinelli, a Peruvian native, is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council.
Further reading
Tue, Jul 2, 2024
What the Peruvian president’s state visit to China means for US economic diplomacy
New Atlanticist By Martin Cassinelli
Peruvian President Dina Boluarte recently traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Washington should take note of the growing Peru-China relationship.
Wed, Nov 13, 2024
As Biden bids farewell, Xi advances China’s influence in Latin America at the APEC Summit in Peru
New Atlanticist By Martin Cassinelli, Caroline Costello
Beijing is successfully pairing its economic diplomacy with action, and the United States should be concerned.
Thu, Aug 24, 2023
Peru’s recession should be a wake-up call for its politicians
New Atlanticist By Martin Cassinelli
After two consecutive quarters of economic decline, Lima needs to renew its social contract with Peruvians, which was so badly damaged during the COVID-19 pandemic and in the years since.
Image: People hold a giant Peruvian flag at a protest against crime and insecurity, in Lima, Peru March 21, 2025. REUTERS/Sebastian Castaneda