China is emerging as naval superpower: A wake-up call for US, India

Since the 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership and continued by subsequent Chinese leaders, the country has gradually opened up to the world, embracing a unique market economy with ‘Chinese characteristics’. The economic growth and consequent trade required China to once again look to the sea.

Without ceasing to be a continental (land) power, China began to develop all facets of maritime power with a target of being a “great maritime power” with enormous influence throughout the world in 40 years. The time has come. Today, China is getting closer to the United States, which has been the greatest maritime power for the last 80 years.

China now boasts the world’s largest navy, surpassing the US. While China has a numerical advantage, the US still holds a qualitative edge, particularly with its fleet of destroyers, guided missile cruisers, and aircraft carriers. However, the dominance of Chinese shipbuilding capacity is many times higher than that of the US.

The Office of (US) Naval Intelligence has projected that China will have 475 battle force ships by 2035, while the US Navy will have around 310. A recent Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report notes that “larger fleets won 25 out of 28 historical wars”. Because the larger fleets have the ability to absorb more losses and keep fighting. That could pose a problem for the US.

China’s Early Maritime Decision

In 2012, during the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the then outgoing President Hu Jintao made a clear call for China to become a leading maritime power. The issue became at the heart of the CCP’s policy agenda. Hu identified four key elements for progress in this area: the ability to exploit ocean resources, the development of a maritime economy, the preservation of the marine environment, and the protection of China’s maritime interests and rights.

In 2013, shortly after assuming the presidency, Xi Jinping advocated that China had to become a “truly great maritime power” not only to consolidate its maritime dominance but also as part of a national strategy designed to link military issues with strategic interests relating to sovereignty, regime legitimacy and great power politics. Xi wanted to advance the development and exploitation of resources in areas over which he considered China had sovereign rights, such as the South China Sea (SCS).

What do we mean by maritime power?

Maritime power is the freedom to carry out activities in the maritime domain. There are four elements of maritime power: naval forces (military domain), maritime entities, oceanic development, and maritime legal systems. The marine industry constitutes an important part of the country’s economy. It should have world-class maritime professionals in science and technology and the capacity to exploit marine resources in a sustainable manner. Its defence capabilities should be significant enough to defend national sovereignty, maritime interests and rights, and play an important role in safeguarding peace and promoting the international development of maritime affairs.

China – a Maritime or Continental Power?

China has more than 22,000 km of land borders (with 14 countries, most importantly Russia and India) and a significant sea frontage on the Western Pacific, with a coastline of almost 15,000 km. Geopolitically, China has to manage the classic complex dichotomy of being a maritime or continental power. Traditionally it has been considered more a continental than a maritime power.

Furthermore, its access to the oceans is not entirely straightforward. Historically, and particularly over the last 600 years, China has been more concerned with its land borders than with its access to the sea. It had remained closed inwards to protect its land-based empire (built the Great Wall) and renounced its maritime aspirations and naval capabilities. With both India and Russia, Chinese relations have not been that trustworthy.

China’s exits to both the western Pacific through the first chain of islands and the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca are highly insecure and threatened. China today claims a maritime boundary in the SCS based on historical rights and is in fact simply a reflection of the boundaries of some of the maritime areas that Admiral Zheng’s fleet explored during the 14th century.

The rise of China as a maritime power is driven more by markets for both raw materials and manufactured goods. Chinese shipbuilding capacity (shipyards), the merchant fleet, the fishing fleet, and the military element (PLAN) have all grown together in the last 40 years. China is already the world’s leading maritime power, even if it is not yet the world’s leading naval power.

Comparing the US and Chinese Fleets

As per the CSIS report, the United States has more high-quality, influential large vessels than the Chinese. Destroyers in particular serve as the backbone of any modern fleet because of their ability to conduct a variety of missions with speed and range. Right now, the United States possesses 73 destroyers, whereas the Chinese have 42. China’s destroyer fleet grew from 20 vessels in 2003 to 42 in 2023. In the last decade, China launched 23 destroyers to America’s 11. So they are catching up.

While the US currently holds an advantage with respect to cruisers and destroyers, China has an advantage in frigates and corvettes – smaller ships that can be used as escorts or fight in the littoral waters of the Indo-Pacific.

Smaller ships are quicker to build and can be maintained in greater numbers. A destroyer or an aircraft carrier can take years to construct. Both the US and China are also seeking to develop armed naval surface and underwater systems smaller than the manned corvettes.

To offset China’s naval quantity, the US is being forced to rely on regional partners like Japan and South Korea. The US and UK (AUKUS) are helping build Australian maritime power. India remains a significant member of the QUAD. Clearly all this dwarfs the Chinese numerical advantage.

As of late 2024, the US Navy (USN) had 296 battle force ships, while China’s navy has over 370. US ships are typically larger than Chinese vessels and have superior sensors, electronics, and weapons. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) includes many smaller ships, such as corvettes, which are too small for high-seas operations. As many as 70 per cent of PLAN warships were launched after 2010, compared to just 25 per cent of USN ships, and they thus are younger and more modern.

The USN has more aircraft carriers, more naval aircraft, and a larger Marine Corps. USN has a strong cyber command and global footprint. USN has global responsibilities, while PLAN focuses primarily on regional duties.

China’s Shipbuilding and Shipping Push

China is already building merchant and warships in the same shipyards, taking advantage of technology and manpower. China has many shipyards, including Dalian Shipbuilding, Jiangnan Shipyard, Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, Qingdao Beihai, Bohai, and Guangzhou Wenchong. Chinese shipyards are known for their efficiency and capacity and are a major player in the global shipbuilding industry.

In terms of its merchant navy, China controls a fleet of more than 5,600 ships, with a transport capacity of 270 million tonnes, making it the second largest merchant ship owner in the world (after Greece). China wants a significant part of its maritime trade to be carried by Chinese-owned ships, owned by Chinese companies (though not necessarily under a Chinese flag).

In addition, China builds, manages and maintains a growing and very significant number of merchant ports all over the world. With more than 100 ports in 63 countries, seven of the ten most important and busiest ones in the world are Chinese.

Some analysts believe that this control of civilian ports around the world will eventually allow China to provide support (including maintenance) to military vessels when necessary. All this growth has happened with direct Chinese state support for the industry.

China has by far the largest fishing fleet in the world, with some estimates at 800,000 vessels, and is responsible for half the world’s catch. The growth of this has been due to state subsidies. China is the world’s largest consumer of fish, accounting for more than a third of the global total. Fisheries are an essential element of national food security objectives, so the size and capacity of their fishing fleet and its protection are national interests.

Military Element of Maritime Power

The most important element of maritime power is the PLAN, its coastguard and the maritime militia. PLAN has transformed in just a few years from a coastal navy (near seas) to one capable of operating in far seas. China has surpassed the US in the number of naval units. The former has around 370 vessels and a forecast of around 440 by 2030, while the latter has around 300, though still at an advantage in terms of capacity and tonnage. The USN has much greater high-intensity battle capacity with 67 nuclear submarines, 11 aircraft carriers, and 111 escorts.

China has more than 80 world-class frigates and destroyers, increasingly capable and relevant amphibious units and a growing submarine force. PLAN submarines are known to be based on the old Russian designs and have high noise levels. Similarly, vessel sophistication is still evolving and some way off.

China’s coastguard is the largest in the world, with more than 225 vessels of at least 500 tonnes displacement capable of operating on the high seas and another 1,000 smaller vessels for coastal waters. There is also the so-called “maritime militia”, an irregular force based on civilian vessels that supports oceanic defence normally integrated into the fishing community.

China wants to be a great maritime power as a way to overcome the humiliations caused by the Western powers in the 19th century. It will use the same tools with which China was humiliated and not be humiliated again. The US wants to contain China as a continental power, thereby preventing it from expanding its political and military influence to neighbouring littorals.

To annex Taiwan and to contain Japan and other US allies in the region, Xi wants to implement his idea of a great maritime power. China’s maritime claims can be interpreted as a sort of Chinese version of the 1983 American Monroe Doctrine, which the US used to dissuade European powers from interfering in the seas that the US considered its natural sphere of influence.

China aims to reclaim maritime spaces in the South China Sea through historical influence under a sort of “Asia for Asians” doctrine. This has already been rejected by Japan, South Korea and Australia, which is causing strong tensions in the region.

Belt and Road Initiative and Hybrid Power

Then there is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to create overland infrastructure linking China to Europe via Central Asia, and the Road part of which seeks a maritime silk road linking China to Southeast Asia, Europe and Africa, with ports and bases in the Indian Ocean. China is thus trying to become the first hybrid continental and maritime great power.

The initiative, however, is facing headwinds due to a number of problems, including mistrust of China by several of the countries involved, especially the “debt trap”, which involves lending money to the country where the infrastructure has been built for its implementation, but when the country cannot pay back the loans, China takes sovereignty over the infrastructure. This is compounded by a dismal human rights record in this initiative.

Slowdown of Economy

In terms of resources and economics, China has a significant lack of water and energy, which also translates into a clear relative slowdown of its economy, from 14 per cent growth in the 2000s to 6 per cent and below since 2019. The demographic problem means that between now and 2050, China will lose 200 million adult-aged working citizens and increase the number of retired people by a similar number. This will lead to enormous social and health care costs. All this will impact trade, shipping and maritime power.

Indian Shipbuilding Industry

India’s shipbuilding industry is growing, with major shipyards in Visakhapatnam, Kochi, Kolkata, Goa and Mumbai. Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) at Kochi is the largest shipbuilding and maintenance facility in India. It has built big vessels up to 120,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT) capacity and has delivered two of India’s largest double-hull Aframax tankers, each of 95,000 DWT.

CSL built India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier. INS Vikrant is the largest warship built by CSL. It has performed major overhauls for the aircraft carrier INS Viraat. CSL has secured shipbuilding orders from internationally renowned companies from Europe and the Middle East.

Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) is a defence public sector undertaking (DPSU) shipyard located in Visakhapatnam, on the east coast of India. HSL is a major shipyard with the capacity to manufacture vessels and repair ships up to 80,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT). It also conducts major overhauls of Indian Navy submarines and is being equipped to construct nuclear-powered submarines. The shipyard is the second biggest after Cochin Shipyard.

The Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) in Mumbai manufactures warships and submarines for the Indian Navy. It also builds tankers, cargo bulk carriers, passenger ships and ferries.

Goa Shipyard, unlike Cochin Shipyard and Hindustan Shipyard, cannot manufacture big vessels of capacity above 15,000 DWT. Their future plans are to build Mine Counter-Measure Vessels, Talwar-class frigates, and fast patrol boats.

To Summarise

China’s ascent as a maritime power has attracted significant attention, both regionally and globally. Through the expansion of its naval capabilities, advancement of marine industries, and modernisation of maritime infrastructure, China has significantly increased its maritime prowess, extending its reach far beyond its coastal waters. Its growing presence in the East and South China Seas, as well as the Indo-Pacific region, remains a focal point in geopolitics.

The raw numbers of naval vessels do not reflect the quality or capabilities or other factors that can influence naval warfare. USN ships are typically larger than Chinese vessels and have superior sensors, electronics, and weapons.

The Chinese submarine force consists mostly of conventional diesel-powered submarines, whereas the 49 attack submarines in the USN are nuclear-powered and far more capable. Similarly, there is a huge disparity in the number of aircraft carriers and larger, more powerful warships, such as cruisers and destroyers. US naval personnel have continuous combat experience for over a century that the PLAN lacks.

China’s massive shipbuilding capacity does give a numerical edge and also offers important advantages in a long war. Most of China’s current production comprises commercial shipping vessels. Modern warships are much more complex to build, but China is catching up on that count.

But larger capacities of shipbuilding are important for war potential and surge production. Beijing is beginning to build more aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines too, and in about half the time it currently takes US shipyards to build the same types of vessels.

Matching China’s shipbuilding capacities may not be a great idea for the US. US allies could take up some of the slack. South Korea and Japan are the second and third largest shipbuilders in the world, respectively. But their exposure to Chinese attacks poses strategic risks.

Should the US build smaller, missile-armed combatants similar to the many corvettes that the Chinese build and invest in relatively inexpensive unmanned vessels to use in innovative ways alongside regular navy ships?

India’s shipbuilding capacities have to increase greatly. India needs many more submarines, and also, a decision for the next aircraft carrier must be taken since it could take over a decade to build. China is pushing ahead. Time to act is now.

The writer is former Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.