Amid looming political instability in Bangladesh, Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus visited China on his first state visit since taking office in August 2024. His four-day itinerary, from 26-29 March, included a red-carpet welcome in Beijing, an address at the Boao Forum, a meeting with President Xi Jinping and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo, an investment dialogue with Chinese business leaders, and the conferral of an honorary degree from Peking University. On all tangible fronts, China leveraged the opportunity to push for a stronger strategic foothold in the region through Bangladesh, reaffirming its commitment to “nurturing Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation”—a partnership that Sheikh Hasina had elevated with Beijing during her visit in July 2024.
For years, China struggled to strengthen its foothold in Bangladesh, as Sheikh Hasina’s government prioritised India in its foreign policy. Beijing’s only viable bet was on the opposition, but Hasina systematically weakened her political adversaries, and alleged election irregularities made it nearly impossible for them to stage a comeback.
Now, with an all-non-Sheikh Hasina and non-Awami League government in power, China extended its highest level of assurances to an interim administration from day one—despite global criticism of its unelected status and its alleged sidelining of the prosecution of crimes against the minority Hindu community. Meanwhile, Yunus has made Hasina’s extradition a non-negotiable condition for re-engagement with Delhi, fully aware that India will not comply.
With Delhi’s influence in Dhaka waning, China has swiftly stepped in to fill the strategic vacuum. But does this deepening China-Bangladesh alignment put India on high alert?
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Yunus spoke what Beijing wished
One statement about India stands out among the many symbolic and substantive outcomes of Yunus’s visit to China. While addressing a roundtable, Yunus added, “Seven States of India—the Eastern part of India, known as the Seven Sisters—are landlocked. They have no way to reach out to the ocean. We are the only guardian of the sea. This opens up a huge possibility (that) this could be an extension of the Chinese economy.”
This remark warrants closer scrutiny, at least by India’s foreign policy and defence establishment, as it signals not only a strategic recalibration in Bangladesh’s foreign policy toward India but also reflects what China must have conveyed to Yunus with regard to making a strategic foothold in India’s Northeastern region—where Beijing continues to dispute the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and makes false claims on India’s sovereign territories, including Arunachal Pradesh.
This statement has caused a media uproar, particularly in India. Still, its implications remain significant, even if one gives the benefit of the doubt and views it purely in the context of attracting greater Chinese investment. It positions Bangladesh as a low-cost manufacturing and labour hub. Yunus may have intended to highlight Bangladesh’s geostrategic location in the Bay of Bengal as a crucial trade corridor, with connectivity through India’s Northeast offering expanded commercial opportunities. However, what cannot be overlooked is the sheer arrogance embedded in the claim of being the “guardian of the sea”—a phrase that, in many ways, signals a strategic shift in Dhaka’s posture.
Yunus’s statement implicitly challenges India’s regional connectivity ambitions by framing Bangladesh as the sole maritime gateway for India’s landlocked Northeast. It also raises concerns about whether Dhaka will close itself off as a transit corridor—and China may well like that—thereby complicating India’s access to the Bay of Bengal. Also, India’s vulnerability through the ‘Chicken’s Neck’ and the broader Northeastern region is no less hidden, and such a statement severely complicates Dhaka’s equation with Delhi. The nature of Yunus’s statement warrants India’s response, and it will be interesting to see how Delhi frames it.
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Tangible offerings
Out of nine agreements signed during Yunus’s visit, China’s promotion of high-quality building of the Belt and Road and the strengthening of international cooperation on industrial and supply chains could result in a significant Chinese economic presence in Bangladesh—something that Hasina had avoided doing so explicitly, considering Delhi’s security concerns.
However, projects like the modernisation of the Mongla Port Facilities and the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram could lead to economic dependency, such as how China leveraged infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka for its strategic benefit.
To say the least, the Mongla Port expansion, if financed primarily through Chinese loans, could put Bangladesh in a difficult position if revenue generation does not meet debt obligations. Considering Yunus is a Nobel laureate in Economics and understands the economy better, he may try to find what suits Bangladesh best in all nationalistic tones. But the question still looms: Is he in a position to bargain big with China as he seeks political security guarantees from the country?
At the same time, by inviting the Chinese companies to the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP), Yunus may have added an extra friction point in ties with India, which is already the lowest in decades. This move not only risks further straining relations with India but also raises strategic concerns in New Delhi, as it could provide Beijing with direct involvement in a critical regional water resource, adding another layer of complexity to an already delicate geopolitical landscape.
While debates over the viability of the TRCMRP have found credible voices questioning its efficiency, the concerns are twofold—first, the project’s environmental impact, particularly regarding long-term ecological sustainability, and second, the fundamental issue of water availability. The Teesta River’s upstream flow is already dwindling, making large-scale management efforts questionable in terms of feasibility. It requires restoration of the negotiations with India. For all its reasons, Teesta is a transboundary river, and any water-sharing agreements and joint management efforts require a consensus with India.
Also read: China and Pakistan could use Bangladesh against India. New Delhi must stabilise the Northeast
An explicit strategic barter
In addition to trade, business, and investments, the political bargain of sorts has explicit undercurrents about India. The joint press release invoked the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”—something China often fails to abide by but makes a point of invoking. But an added explanation that “China consistently adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, respects Bangladesh’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, supports Bangladesh in safeguarding its national independence, respects the development path independently chosen by the people of Bangladesh, and supports Bangladesh in exploring a development path suited to its own national conditions” subtly targets India for its past-support to Sheikh Hasina and for offering her exile.
Interestingly, the political security guarantees amid global criticism of Muhammad Yunus are worth reading in the joint press release. It adds, “China has always followed a policy of good neighbourliness and friendship toward the people of Bangladesh and supports the Interim Government of Bangladesh in effectively exercising governance, preserving unity and stability in Bangladesh, and leading Bangladesh onto a path of development and prosperity.” While Yunus has made the completion of reforms a precondition for elections in Bangladesh, this political security guarantee will at least ensure regional backing, which, in the absence of friendly ties with India, has been missing.
A barter for political security guarantees from Beijing led Dhaka to offer what China seeks from countries worldwide—adherence to the One-China Principle. While standard joint statements with China often highlight One-China, what stood out in the Bangladesh-China release was the phrase: “Bangladesh opposes Taiwan independence.” Although the One-China principle suffices, including this statement reflects the dependent nature of the other party’s relationship with China. In December 2025, a similar statement appeared in the China-Nepal Joint Statement during Nepalese Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit, who is a known critic of India. This underscores the vulnerability of smaller neighbouring countries that aim to carve out a space away from India by dealing with China.
To conclude, if Yunus sees a red-carpet welcome in China as an approval of his interim government, it may reflect a narrow approach. He must ensure that Beijing’s strategic ambitions don’t outweigh Dhaka’s national interests. He must remember that China offers no freebies, and they must be avoided if they come at a cost of added friction with India.
Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. He writes on the Asia-Pacific affairs, strategic Himalayas, and South Asian geopolitics. He tweets @RishiGupta_JNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)