Israel, the US, Iran: It’s Much About Messaging

Recent strikes by Israel, the United States, and Iran have prompted concerns that an escalation of conflict to broader regional proportions may be close at hand. Closer examination reveals a more careful selection of strikes, demonstrating deterrence and resolve. 

April witnessed several days of highly tense hostilities between Israel, the US, and Iran. Key events included Israel’s and Iran’s willingness to launch for the first time significant direct kinetic attacks and retaliatory strikes against targets within each other’s sovereign territory, and Washington’s full commitment to Israel’s defence. Events also sent key messaging about the military strengths and weaknesses of each state, their capability requirements for successful offence/defence should warfare escalate, and the decision, at least for now, by Iran and the US, to contain any serious escalation of conflict.

The succession of events which contributed to these increased tensions included Israel’s killing by a missile strike of senior officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran’s diplomatic Consulate in Syria’s capital, Damascus; Iran’s large scale but deliberately low-impact retaliatory drone and missile strike against various military targets in Israel; and Israel’s retaliatory and also deliberately limited strike on an Iranian military air base outside Isfahan, in central Iran.

In a historical context, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s consistent messaging has been that state and non-state actors actively hostile to Israel remain legitimate targets. In addition to Iran, non-state regional militia include Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and other organisations in Syria and Bahrain. The militia are seen as Iran’s proxies, motivated, armed, financed and trained by Iran. However, the extent to which Iran, or the IRGC’s Quds force which is the Iranian/militia interface, actually controls their actions, is contestable.

Israel has also consistently demonstrated its readiness to strike at threats, both human and physical, by both overt and covert means. Damascus was just that, although Israel chose this time to very publicly breach the diplomatic no-go boundary. Was this too tempting a target, especially if Israel blamed the Hamas attack at least partly on Iran? However, there is no known evidence that Iran knew of or specifically condoned that attack, or would have supported it, had they known because of the inevitable consequences. This might be one driving factor why Iran and other proxies have not provided military support to Hamas post 7 October.

So what were the lessons of these events?

The first, flowing from 1 April, and despite Israel’s spectacular intelligence assessment failure in the lead up to and including 7 October, was a further demonstration of the reach and accuracy of Israeli intelligence regionally, and particularly into the inner-sanctums of Iran and its proxies. Related to this is Israel‘s willingness to strike any target, anywhere, they deem justified by operational and political outcomes. For Iran and its proxies, one strong message was their security and safety cannot be taken for granted.

Secondly, on 14 April, it must be seen as necessary, for domestic and international reasons, for Iran’s leadership to be seen to retaliate, through a major and very public missile and drone attack, targeting Israeli sovereignty. However, to avoid precipitating a broader escalation of warfare, Israel and the US were informally notified of the attack some 72 hours beforehand. Nearly all of the 300 or so missiles and drones were shot down, and presumedly most were expected to be shot down, by Israel’s Iron Dome and US and allied air defence systems. For all participants, credibility was maintained.

The major message was the effectiveness of the Israeli/US air defence systems in this partly choreographed but strategically calculated scenario. But what would the effectiveness be against some 3000-plus missiles and drones, launched without warning, simultaneously by Iran, Hezbollah, and other militia, and especially if similar high-level US tactical support was not possible because of US higher priority commitments elsewhere e.g. Taiwan and/or Ukraine? Would Israeli and lower-level US defences be overwhelmed?

Thirdly, the US confirmation of their commitment to Israel’s defence against any attack by Iran or its proxies in support of Hamas was unequivocal, by President Joe Biden verbally, and through the dispatch of two US carrier strike groups to the region. Besides the urgent dispatch of additional military supplies to Israel following Hamas’ attack, the US’s very prominent participation in downing Iranian missiles and drones on 14 April left Iran and its proxies in no doubt about US defensive and offensive military involvement should conflict escalate. These implications would certainly have conditioned Iran’s response above.

Fourthly, Israel’s retaliatory strike on 19 April, targeting Isfahan in central Iran, sent several messages. Reportedly, the attack was launched against strong US advice not to do so. However, Netanyahu made two points to both the US and Iran. He informed the White House he would not be dictated to by the US. This was not a new message. He also sent a very blunt message to the Iranians of the vulnerability of their key national security facilities. One clear implication was that the Isfahan target could just as easily been the nearby Natanz uranium enrichment plant, a very high priority target for the Israelis if Iran proceeds with the production of nuclear weapons.

Some media reporting also alleged the Israelis used short-range drones (quadcopters) to attack the Isfahan air base, which would have been launched within Iran. If true, and not just mischievous propaganda, the Iranians have an even broader security issue.

During and following the above events, Iran and the US made it very public they do not want hostilities to escalate to a broader and more serious outbreak of warfare across the Middle East. However, Israel’s intentions remain open. Netanyahu has repeatedly emphasised that Israel will take whatever action is necessary to defend itself against any threat. He has defined no boundaries.

In a broader context, but inclusive of the above, there has been other messaging. Israel’s right to defend itself is not in question. Nor is recognition that counter-terrorist operations in a densely populated urban environment can incur a high level of civilian casualties, especially where separating terrorists from civilians is difficult and terrorists use civilian infrastructure to operational advantage. However, Israeli operations in Gaza have been seen as unnecessarily excessive and brutal, and aimed at the collective punishment of Palestinians generally, not just Hamas. Even Biden has described them as “over the top,” and threatened sanctions on an Israeli military unit for human rights abuses. This has been compounded by Israel deliberately obstructing the flow of essential aid to Palestinians such as food, health services, and other basic needs.

It remains to be seen whether Netanyahu, who projects a strong uncompromising persona, will heed the international humanitarian concerns above, or given his commitment to destroy Hamas, operations in Rafah will be more of the same.

In both a domestic and international context, the Australian government, together with other nations, has expressed its deep concern about the conflict in Gaza, the dire humanitarian situation, and the necessity for a workable ceasefire that will contribute, ultimately, to long-term peace and stability between Israel and Palestine. The government’s recent decision to resume its contributions to UNRWA is a positive step in maintaining its humanitarian support for those Palestinians desperately in need.

Domestically, the government’s priority challenge is to protect national unity by reversing the growth of antisemitism and islamophobia.

Ian Dudgeon is a former president of the AIIA’s ACT Branch.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.